

ASSOCIATED PRESS
31 December 1982

WASHINGTON

KISSINGER BELIEVES SOVIETS BEHIND ATTEMPT ON POPE' LIFE

Accounts that have emerged so far on the assassination attempt on the pope lead "almost to no other conclusion" than that the Soviet secret service was behind it, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said Friday.

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"Here is a Turkish terrorist, who suddenly shows up in Bulgaria, which is not the normal thing for a Turk to do, lives in the best hotel in Bulgaria, emerges with \$50,000 and a weapon, travels all over Europe. It cannot happen without the Bulgarian secret police," Kissinger said in a Cable News Network interview.

The interview was taped Wednesday for broadcast Friday and Sunday.

"It's nonsense to say, as I read somewhere, that maybe something got away from the higher levels. That does not happen in Bulgaria. Then it had to be the Soviets. The Bulgarians have no interest in coming after the pope."

Kissinger continued, "... they must have concluded that they had to crush Solidarity. At that time in 1981, they must have thought that the possibility existed that the Red Army would have to go in.

"In that case if there were a Polish Pope who did what he was alleged to have threatened, go to Poland and oppose them, that would be a formidable psychological problem."

Kissinger said he had been told by Richard Helms, former head of the CIA, that "it had all the earmarks to them of a KGB operation."

"If you try to square the known facts, it really leads almost to no other conclusion."

Yrui Andropov, the new Soviet leader, was head of the KGB at the time.

Asked what the implications of that were, Kissinger said: "I take it we will never know more than we know. We don't negotiate with the Soviets because we like them. ... The Soviets will ruthlessly pursue their own interests. Our problem is whether in a nuclear world the Soviets pursuing their own interest and we pursuing our interest can ease the potential conflicts and reduce the danger of confrontation."

On the two sets of negotiations now under way with the Soviets, the strategic and the intermediate-range nuclear missile talks in Geneva, Switzerland, Kissinger said, "the difference between the two sides is not so irreconcilable."

Kissinger was the primary negotiator of the SALT I treaty and the unratified SALT II treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons.

Noting pressure for a nuclear freeze from some sectors of U.S. public opinion, he said, "I do not think it is useful and I do not think it is communist manipulated."

NEW YORK TIMES
27 DECEMBER 1982

WASHINGTON — On Nov. 9, the day before Leonid Brezhnev died, Italian Interior Minister Virginio Rognoni received a visit from the C.I.A.'s vice-chief of station in Rome and a staffer from the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee. The Americans wanted to know about the Bulgarian connection to the shooting of the Pope.

Mr. Rognoni explained that Ali Agca, the Turkish gunman, had been informed a few months before that Italy could not afford the cost of keeping him in solitary confinement much longer. To Mr. Agca, that meant he would be transferred to an ordinary prison and would promptly be murdered. That induced him to talk about the Bulgarian Government officials who hired him to kill the Pope.

"What proof do you have?" asked the C.I.A. man.

The man in charge of Italy's internal security laid out the facts: that the gunman was a cold-blooded killer for hire, and not a fanatic or ideologue; that he was able to pass into Bulgaria easily on an Indian passport and take up residence in a first-class hotel, which requires secret service knowledge; that he entered penniless and came out with \$50,000 from what is hardly a land of opportunity; that he was able to describe accurately the living quarters of the Bulgarian officials who were his controls and contacts; and that a flurry of electronic communication came out of the Bulgarian Embassy just before the attack on the Pope, similar to the activity that took place before an American general was abducted.

The C.I.A. man waved that all aside. "You have no proof," he said, and did his best to convey to the Italian Government a high degree of skepticism from the American Government.

"What proof do you want?" asked Mr. Rognoni. The circumstantial evidence already presented, along with some more that the gunman was expected to reveal, was the best that

ESSAY

'You Have No Proof'

By William Safire

could be garnered on a covert operation. Nobody would come forward with a fingerprint of Yuri Andropov on the gun, but it was certain that no such mission could be undertaken without the permission of the K.G.B., then headed by Mr. Andropov.

According to one report of the meeting, the C.I.A. representative continued to view with distaste the conclusions being reached by the Italian investigators. Meanwhile, in other capitals — and in Washington — middle-level C.I.A. men with journalistic contacts have been pooh-poohing the story. In Rome, U.S. foreign service officers have been telling Italian diplomats that the investigation is an international embarrassment.

Thus, the Italian Government found itself pursuing a case that caused it to strain relations with a Communist neighbor and profoundly offend the new Soviet leader without the moral support of the government of the United States. The lackadaisical attitude of most of the U.S. press on this subject throughout the early winter — especially after the man who had to have at least guilty knowledge of the plot was elevated to the top post in the Kremlin — was seen by Italians as further evidence that the U.S. wanted the investigation shut down.

Why do we require tongs to touch

this story? Why are we setting ourselves standards of proof that the Soviet bloc will make impossible to meet? STAT

One reason is humanly institutional: most spooks, after the C.I.A.'s flat rock was flipped over in the post-Watergate era, don't want anybody to think that assassination is part of any nation's "dirty tricks," and so they come to the defense of the K.G.B. in grand le Carré fashion, hinting that the evidence is part of an anti-Andropov plot. (An exception is former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, who was pointing a finger at this "classic intelligence operation" from the start.)

Another reason has to do with the workings of the American press: where does a story of such magnitude come off being broken in the Readers' Digest, and developed in detail by NBC, a mere television network? Such a story needs establishment legitimacy; only a major newspaper can properly provide that.

Then there is the bogglement factor: the story of the spy-master who gave the order to kill the Pope and thereby saved Poland from Solidarity and rose to the top in the Kremlin — that's a large lump of information to digest. Evil so audacious is unbelievable.

The central reason for the shameful reluctance to urge the Italians on is political: we have to deal with this man Andropov, say our doves, and if the chain of circumstance is drawn too tight we might not be able to trust the Soviets on arms control.

That fear of not being able to bring back détente motivates most of those who wish this awful trail of circumstance would vanish. We know enough; they do not want to know any more.

That is why, after facts are presented which compel common sense to lay the crime at the Kremlin door, we will hear the faceless officials complain, "you have no proof."

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ON PAGE 22 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150027-1

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 DECEMBER 1982

Readers write

Response from Mr. Helms

Since the Monitor has a reputation with me for accuracy in reporting, I would like to bring to your attention the item that appears on page two of the Nov. 24 edition in which you report that I "lied about the (Chilean) plot in Senate hearings."

The fact is that I was never charged with lying. I pleaded nolo contendere to not having testified "fully and completely" before a Senate committee in 1973. My testimony took place at a time when ongoing secret operations would have been exposed by a "full and complete" statement on my part.

Washington

Richard Helms

[Ed. note: The statement that Mr. Helms lied about a plot to assassinate President Allende of Chile was cited in a brief wire service report and attributed to an Atlantic Monthly article drawn from Seymour Hersh's book, "The Price of Power: Kissinger in Nixon's White House." In fairness, it should have been stated that the article does not explicitly use the word "lie," but leaves such an implication.]

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WASHINGTON POST
13 DECEMBER 1982

Testimony on Spy Planes Shrouded Chapter of Co

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

A heavily shrouded chapter of Cold War history has been reopened with new insights and controversy arising from recently declassified testimony of CIA chief Allen W. Dulles on spy plane operations against the Soviet Union in the 1950s and early 1960s.

Members of the U.S. intelligence community from the Dulles era were dismayed a week ago by news accounts about an allegedly undisclosed "CIA spy plane" shot down over the Soviet Union before the sensational U2 overflight of Francis Gary Powers May 1, 1960.

Dulles' testimony was given behind closed doors to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 31, 1960, during the international uproar about the U2 high-altitude reconnaissance jet plane and the collapse of the Paris summit conference in mid-May that year when Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev vented his outrage over the flight by the captured American pilot.

News reports last week based on Dulles' testimony said he disclosed that the United States lost "eight or nine" Central Intelligence Agency operatives on an earlier "spy plane" forced down in the Soviet Union.

State Department officials, after consulting with the CIA, told questioners that the reports were incorrect and that Dulles evidently was referring to the widely publicized loss of a U.S. Air Force plane and crew over the Turkish-Soviet border in 1958.

"Many colleagues of Dulles similarly said he only was citing a known incident in 1958—a second one in which a plane was forced down across that frontier.

There were two problems with the explanations, however. The two groups were talking about two episodes, and neither fully meshed with Dulles' testimony. No one will-

However, from information now available, it appears that in the tense U2 inquiry, Dulles deliberately scrambled his testimony to shield the identity of the then-supersecret National Security Agency, or unwittingly mixed up the two incidents. Possibly he did both.

As one associate recalled, a Dulles technique in maintaining an aura of certainty in his testimony was to "give quick answers to deflect questions and never appear hesitant or in doubt."

One encounter involved an Air Force C118 on a CIA courier mission with nine men aboard—three formally assigned to the CIA—and forced down about 100 miles inside Soviet Armenia in June, 1958. Five of the nine Air Force officers aboard descended by parachute, and four landed with the aircraft. All were released after 10 days of questioning.

In September, 1958, a second, deadlier incident occurred in the same region. An Air Force C130 with 17 military personnel aboard, on assignment to the National Security Agency, and packed with electronic eavesdropping gear for gathering intelligence, was shot down and crashed in Armenia.

Six bodies were returned by the Soviet Union, but 11 were never recovered. In 1962, after stormy dispute at the highest levels of the U.S. and Soviet governments, the 11 missing were officially "presumed dead," although efforts to recover the bodies were still being made in 1972.

That episode is recounted in a revealing book on the NSA, "The Puzzle Palace" by James Bamford. It reprints an extraordinary transcript of monitored conversations by Soviet fighter pilots during the attack on the C130. The transcript made public in 1959 by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Allen's brother, Kremlin to account for the missing crew members.

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sions, known as "ferrets", operated around the vast periphery of the Soviet Union to pick up emissions of radar, ground communications and microwave signals.

Sometimes—accidentally or deliberately—they penetrated Soviet territory during what were called risky "fox and hounds" forays to set off Soviet air defense radar and in these instances American aircraft often were fired upon.

Allen Dulles, in his 1960 testimony, evidently overlapped both incidents. He said, "You may recall there have been several instances of planes that have strayed over Soviet territory which have been shot down. You recall the two incidents in Armenia and the Caucasus a few years ago, and there have been instances off the tip of Japan and some near Alaska."

He went on to say, "In one case we are still endeavoring to get back, you know—they haven't told us what happened to, I think, eight or nine of the crew of one of the planes that came down in the area of Caucasus."

"This was a civilian plane," Dulles said. "It was manned by employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, not by military personnel. They were in civilian clothes. It was an entirely civilian intelligence operation, and I was prepared to take the responsibility and document that responsibility."


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ATLANTIC MONTHLY MAGAZINE
December 1982

THE PRICE OF POW

Kissinger, Nixon, and Chile

BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH



Y EOMAN CHARLES E. RADFORD DID NOT WANT TO BE reassigned to Washington, but it was the fall of 1970 and he was in the Navy and his country was at war. Radford, twenty-seven years old, had been hand-picked by Rear Admiral Rembrandt C. Robinson to serve as his confidential aide and secretary on the National Security Council staff in the White House. The bright and ambitious Radford was an obvious choice for the sensitive job: he was married and had young children; he was a devout Mormon who did not drink and would never consider using drugs; and he was fierce in his determination to earn a commission and become a Navy officer. Radford reported for duty on September 18, replacing a civilian secretary who was being transferred. There was obvious tension in the office, and Admiral Robinson, in one of their first meetings, demonstrated why, Radford recalls: "He made it clear that my loyalty was to him, and that he expected my loyalty, and that I wasn't to speak outside of the office about what I did in the office."

Admiral Robinson was the liaison officer between the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, and his office was a sensitive one: the White House's most highly classified documents, including intelligence materials, routinely flowed through it. By mid-1970, Henry A. Kissinger, President Richard Nixon's national security adviser, had developed complete confidence in Robinson's discretion and loyalty.

It was not surprising, therefore, that Robinson was deeply involved in the secret Kissinger and Nixon operations against Salvador Allende Gossens, of Chile, who had astounded the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House by winning the September 4 popular election for the Chilean presidency, although Allende received only 36.6 percent of the vote in a three-way race. Radford, who arrived at his new post a few weeks after the Chilean election, vividly recalls the sense of crisis: "This wasn't supposed to happen. It was a real blow. All of a sudden, the pudding blew up on the stove." Admiral Robinson and his superiors were "wringing their hands" over Chile, Radford says, "almost as if they [the Chileans] were errant children." Over the next few weeks, Radford says, he saw "options papers, as the bureaucracy sought to prevent Allende from assuming office. Among the options was a proposal to assassinate Allende."